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ANNOTATED BRIEF OF PROFESSORS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMPARATIVE LAW AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS IN SAMANTAR V YOUSUF
by
Chimine I. Keitner*
This annotated amicus brief from Samantar v. Yousuf presents the
argument, which was advanced by amici Professors of Public
International Law and Comparative Law, that non-fSIA sources of
foreign official immunity do not provide a blanket shield from personal
liability for universally recognized international law violations, even if
such violations were committed by individuals who held government
positions. Because non-FSIA immunities derive from a variety of legal
sources, it is not possible to reduce them to a single category. Sources of
immunity outside the FSIA include international treaties providing
certain immunities for accredited diplomats and consuls. They also
include customary international law, which may be incorporated as
federal common law, providing limited immunities such as that afforded
sitting heads of state.
Additionally, some courts have recognized certain immunities for
foreign officials who were not diplomats, consuls, or sitting heads of
state, but they have done so inconsistently, usually in the contexts of suits
in which the state is either the real party in interest or a necessary party.
As amici Professors had counseled, the Supreme Court did not need to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law; Counsel of Record for Professors of Public International Law and Comparative
Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010) (No. 08-1555). The original amicus brief was filed with the support of Robert
E. Freitas, Nitin Gambhir, and Christopher Yeh of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP. The signatories were DavidJ. Bederman, Frederic L. Kirgis, Ved P. Nanda, Mary
Ellen O'Connell, Mathias Reimann, Steven R. Ratner, and Leila N. Sadat. Thanks are
due to all of these individuals for their participation in the original brief, which is
available online at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-
1555_RespondentAmCulntlandComparativeLawProfs.pdf. The author takes sole
responsibility for the contents of this annotated version.
Editor's note: Much of this Article is composed of quotations of the original amicus
brief submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, which are clearly set off
from the author's commentary as block quotations. The footnotes within those
quotations are reprinted from the original brief and were not added for this Article.
However, the numbering and citation format of those footnotes was edited to comply
with Lewis & Clark Law Review practices. Note 13 infra is the only note from the
original brief that contains additional commentary added for this Article, which is
indicated by brackets surrounding the addition.
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address these authorities in order to find that the FSIA does not apply to
cases such as the one against Samantar. The research contained in this
brief will remain relevant in determining the scope of common-law
immunity on remand in the Samantar case, and in other cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 1, 2010, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Samantar v. Yousuf' a case involving the interpretation of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) . The Court held unanimously
that the FSIA does not govern the immunity of current or former foreign
officials from suit in U.S. courts. Instead, such immunity "is properly
governed by the common law."3
Although the Samantar decision focused the spotlight on common-
law immunity, it refrained from delineating the scope of such immunity.4
That is consistent with the position advanced by amici Professors of Public
International Law and Comparative Law. This symposium contribution
places the arguments of amici in context, and suggests how these
arguments should inform judicial reasoning about the scope of common-
law immunity going forward.
II. INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici intervened in support of Respondents to provide the Court
with an analysis of certain legal authorities that Petitioner had
misconstrued:
Amici curiae... have an interest in the proper understanding of
the legal authorities bearing on the potential immunities of former
130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010).
2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
3 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292. See Chimane I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A
Response to Bradley and Goldsmith, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1 (2010),
http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf (setting forth
arguments against applying the FSIA to suits against foreign officials).
4 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292-93. See Chimine I. Keitner, The Common Law of
Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 61 (2010) (sketching the legal landscape for
immunity claims following Samantar).
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foreign officials who are otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts [footnote omitted]. Petitioner and his amici have filed briefs
in this case that misconstrue such authorities and rely on them for
the overly broad proposition that current and former foreign
officials enjoy absolute immunity from suit under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-
1606, 1608, and as a matter of international law.
This Court should not address non-FSIA sources of immunity in
the first instance.- There is no need to address these authorities in
order to find, as the Fourth Circuit properly did, that the FSIA does
not apply in this case. However, because Petitioner and his amici
have relied on certain non-FSIA authorities, we respectfully submit
this brief in order to provide the Court with what is, in our view, a
more accurate and faithful account of their meaning, and to call
other, more relevant cases to the Court's attention.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici began by emphasizing two main points of disagreement:
Petitioner makes two unsupported assertions. First, Petitioner
asserts that "pre-1976 common law immunized a state's officials for
their official acts." Pet. Br. at 17. He relies heavily on this assertion
for his conclusion that the FSIA should be read to include former
foreign officials notwithstanding the FSIA's omission of any
reference to individuals in its definition of the term "foreign state."
See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Second, Petitioner claims that "the
overwhelming current international authority" provides immunity to
former foreign officials sued in their personal capacity for acts of
torture and extrajudicial killing. Id. at 19. The authorities Petitioner
cites, and significant authorities that he omits to cite, do not
support these assertions.
Refuting these two assertions was important because Samantar
argued that the FSIA should be read as codifying a pre-existing law of
blanket immunity for foreign officials, and that any other reading would
violate a current international law requirement of blanket immunity.6
Amici countered:
Simply put, non-FSIA sources of foreign official immunity do not
provide a blanket shield from personal liability for universally
recognized international law violations, even if such violations were
As Justice Kennedy wrote for himself, the ChiefJustice [Rehnquist], and justice
Thomas in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, this Court "need not, and ought not, resolve
the question [of pre-FSIA immunity] in the first instance. Neither the District Court
nor the Court of Appeals has yet addressed it. The issue is complex and would benefit
from more specific briefing, arguments, and consideration of the international law
sources bearing upon the scope of [non-FSIA] immunity." 541 U.S. 677, 728 (2004)
(Kennedy,J., dissenting). The same is true here.
6 See Brief of Petitioner at 31-41, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No.
08-1555).
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committed by individuals who held government positions. Because
non-FSIA immunities derive from a variety of legal sources, it is not
possible to reduce them to a single category. Sources of immunity
outside the FSIA include international treaties providing certain
immunities for accredited diplomats and consuls. They also include
customary international law, which may be incorporated as federal
common law, providing limited immunities such as that afforded
sitting heads of state. Additionally, some courts have recognized
certain immunities for foreign officials who were not diplomats,
consuls, or sitting heads of state, but they have done so
inconsistently, usually in the contexts of suits in which the state is
either the real party in interest or a necessary party.
Amici went on to emphasize that "[t]he cases on which Petitioner
relies do not support the blanket immunity he claims. Instead, they
support much narrower, specialized immunities, none of which applies
to Petitioner." That said, they repeated that "this Court need not and
should not pronounce on the scope of any immunities that might exist
outside the FSIA in the first instance." The Court agreed, stating that "we
need not and do not resolve the dispute among the parties as to the
precise scope of an official's immunity at common law."'
IV. PRE-FSIA U.S. CASE LAW
Samantar argued that the FSIA codified a pre-existing law of blanket
immunity for foreign officials," but pre-1976 cases involving foreign
officials were relatively few and far between. These cases did not support
blanket immunity. For example, Samantar cited a 1797 Attorney General
opinion.9 Amici indicated that this opinion, and a similar opinion issued
three years earlier, did not support a rule of blanket immunity:
Petitioner cites a 1797 opinion by Attorney General Charles Lee
indicating that "a person acting under a commission from a foreign
sovereign is not amenable for what he does in pursuance of his
commission" to any U.S. court. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797), cited in
Pet. Br. 27. Petitioner fails to mention that Lee specifically affirmed
in the same opinion that the controversy between the plaintiffs and
the defendant "is entitled to a trial according to law," and that Lee
declined to intervene in the case. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 at *2. Lee's
position appears to have been that the claim of official authority
could be a defense on the merits, not an immunity from suit.
Petitioner also fails to mention a 1794 opinion by Attorney
General William Bradford, cited in Lee's opinion, in which the
Executive similarly declined to intervene in pending litigation
against a former foreign official. In that case, Bradford opined that
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2290.
8 See id. at 2289.
See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 6, at 27 (citing Actions Against Foreigners, 1
Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797)).
612 [Vol. 15:3
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Victor Collot, the late Governor of the French colony of
Guadeloupe, should not be obliged to give bail, but that the former
Governor would nevertheless have to "defend himself by such
means as his counsel shall advise." 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 45 at *2 (1794).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the defendant
properly could be held to bail, whether or not he would ultimately
be found liable. Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247, 248 (1796).
Amici also highlighted the case of People v. McLeod,o a nineteenth-
century precedent involving criminal and civil charges against an alleged
participant in the attack on the steamboat Caroline'
In the important case of People v. McLeod, 25 Wend. *483 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1841), which Petitioner does not discuss or cite, the highest
court of general jurisdiction sitting in New York at that time rejected
the defendant's claim to immunity. Alexander McLeod, a British
subject and former deputy sheriff of the Niagara District in Upper
Canada, faced criminal and civil charges in a New York court for his
alleged involvement in the 1837 attack on the steamboat Caroline.
The British Ambassador to the United States, Henry Fox, claimed
that McLeod should be entitled to immunity because the attack
"was a public act of persons in her majesty's service, obeying the
order of their superior authorities." Letter from Mr. Fox to Mr.
Forsyth (Dec. 13, 1840)." Secretary of State John Forsyth replied
that the circumstances would not justify intervention by the U.S.
government, even if the government could intervene (which he
doubted):
The president is not aware of any principle of international
law, or, indeed, of reason or justice, which entitles such
offenders to impunity before the legal tribunals, when coming
voluntarily within their independent and undoubted
jurisdiction, because they acted in obedience to their superior
authorities, or because their acts have become the subject of
diplomatic discussion between the two governments.
Letter from Mr. Forsyth to Mr. Fox (Dec. 26, 1840). A unanimous
three-judge panel of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature,
1o 25 Wend. 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
" For additional materials related to the Caroline incident and the McLeod
prosecution, see John E. Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to
Force, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIEs 263 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark
W.Janis eds., 2007).
12 All cited correspondence is reprinted in the McLeod opinion.
" Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who was appointed when President Martin
Van Buren replaced William Henry Harrison, would have given more weight to
McLeod's "superior orders" defense, but he also disclaimed any power to intervene.
Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841). [That said, it appears that
Webster did all he could to ensure that McLeod was represented by skilled legal
counsel, since he was afraid that McLeod's detention and conviction would further
strain relations with the United Kingdom. See Noyes, supra note 11, at 279-80.
McLeod presented an alibi defense and was ultimately acquitted by the jury. See David
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which included future U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Samuel Nelson,"
denied McLeod's claim of immunity.
V. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The argument that foreign officials enjoy blanket immunity for their
"official acts" rests at least in part on the idea that one sovereir state
should not sit in judgment on the acts of another sovereign state. 'As the
Justices recognized, however, this does not mean that officials are
automatically entitled to immunity. Consider the following exchange
from oral argument between Samantar's counsel Shay Dvoretzky and
Justice Ginsburg:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, when you-going back to where you
started-you started saying the officer must go together with the
state, because in reality it's the same thing; it's a suit against the
state.
But this is a case seeking money out of the pocket of Samantar
and no money from the treasury of Somalia, so why is the suit
against the officer here equivalent to a suit against the state?
MR. DVORETZKY: Because the touchstone of foreign sovereign
immunity law, which the FSIA codified, is that one nation's courts
cannot sit in judgment of another nation's acts. And the basis for
liability that's asserted in this case is Samantar's acts on behalf of
the state of Somalia.
The issue is not who pays the judgment; the issue is whose acts
are in question. Now, in the domestic context, of course, the
distinction between personal liability and liability from the state
may matter, but that's only because-
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, that sounds like you're-you're
talking about an "act of state" doctrine, not that the suit against one
is the equivalent of a suit against the other.
MR. DVORETZKY: The "act of state" doctrine is distinct from
immunity doctrines, although they have certain shared
underpinnings and shared comity considerations. And just as the
under-act of state doctrine is concerned with not judging the acts
of foreign states, so too is foreign sovereign immunity law. That's
the fundamental premise of foreign-of foreign sovereignty
immunity law."'
J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior Orders and the American
Writ ofHabeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515, 526 (1992).]
" See Bederman, supra note 13, at 523 (citing 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 186 (1974)).
' SeeSamantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2290 (2010).
6 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010) (No. 08-1555).
[Vol. 15:3614
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Amici counseled against conflating the Act of State doctrine with
foreign official immunity, which Samantar had also done in his written
submissions:
Petitioner cites two additional cases from this period, but these
cases both involved the Act of State doctrine, not jurisdictional
immunity. Pet. Br. 32 n.3, citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250
(1897) (upholding a directed verdict for defendant who allegedly
requisitioned plaintiffs water works during a military occupation,
after the case was tried on the merits); Hatch v. Baez, 14 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 596, 600 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (holding that acts of a "foreign
and friendly" government taken within its own territory should not
be subject to adjudication in U.S. courts). Petitioner cannot
bootstrap cases on the prudential Act of State doctrine, which is a
defense on the ments, to support his blanket claim to immunity
from jurisdiction.
In concrete terms, the distinction between official immunity and the Act
of State doctrine means that an individual defendant cannot simply assert
in response to a particular claim: "I was acting on behalf of a foreign
state, therefore I am automatically immune from the jurisdiction of any
U.S. court." The absence of automatic immunity is also clear from the
United States' brief in Samantar v. Yousuf in which the United States
declined to support a rule of blanket immunity under the FSIA and
instead opined that, in determining whether or not to suggest immunity
for Samantar,
the Executive [or, presumably, courts] reasonably could find it
appropriate to take into account petitioner's residence in the
United States rather than Somalia, the nature of the acts alleged,
" This Court has emphasized that the prudential Act of State doctrine is separate
and distinct from the jurisdictional doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Republic
of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) (stating that "[u]nlike a claim of
sovereign immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state
doctrine provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits."); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438 (1964) (distinguishing between act
of state doctrine and foreign sovereign immunity). Cases applying the Act of State
doctrine have established that universally condemned human rights violations are not
"acts of state." See, e.g., Ochoa Lizarbe v. Rivera Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 488
(D. Md. 2009) (finding that alleged acts of torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes
against humanity by a former Lieutenant in the Peruvian army "are not deemed
official acts for the purposes of the acts of state doctrine"); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493, 498 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992) (restating earlier holding that claims of torture
and summary execution against President Ferdinand Marcos are not "nonjusticiable
'acts of state'"); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962)
(rejecting Act of State defense to extradition of former President of Venezuela for
offense of "embezzlement or criminal malversation by public officers"); S. REP. No.
102-249, at 8 (1991) (indicating that the Act of State doctrine "cannot shield former
officials from liability" under the TVPA); cf Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419,
1432-33 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying application of Act of State doctrine because the
foreign state was not acting in the public interest, there was a large degree of
international consensus prohibiting the activity, and the act occurred in the United
States).
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respondents' invocation of the statutory right of action in the TVPA
[Torture Victim Protection Act] against torture and extrajudicial
killing, and the lack of any recognized government of Somalia that
could opine on whether petitioner's alleged actions were taken in
an official capacity or that could decide whether to waive any
immunity that petitioner otherwise might enjoy."
The executive branch's insistence on a multi-factor approach, which is
not yet comprehensively codified in any statute, was more consistent with
past U.S. practice than Samantar's argument for blanket immunity.
VI. TWENTIETH-CENTURY U.S. DECISIONS
Samantar repeated the claim to blanket immunity in his reply brief,
stating that "the common law of foreign sovereign immunity ... draws no
distinction between suits seeking a judgment against the state and those
seeking money from the official, but immunizes all official acts on the
state's behalf."9 To the contrary, amici presented the following analysis of
prior cases, which could not fairly be read to support Samantar's
sweeping characterization:
The more recent cases Petitioner cites do not support his
sweeping claim that U.S. courts "routinely held that officials acting
in their official capacities were entitled to immunity derived from
that of the state itself' before 1976. Pet. Br. 27. To the contrary,
courts did not uniformly find immunity, and no court found
immunity in circumstances resembling those at issue here.
The pre-FSIA, twentieth-century cases Petitioner cites involved
the specialized context of suits in property and contract. See, e.g.,
Oetjen v. Central Leather Company, 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (affirming the
dismissal of two suits in replevin involving the title to hides
confiscated and sold by Mexican revolutionary forces in the
occupied city of Torreon). Although the "restrictive" theory of
sovereign immunity emerged during this period tojustify subjecting
foreign states themselves to U.S. jurisdiction for their commercial
activities, individual officials were sometimes-but not always-
afforded immunity in connection with these commercial activities.
Federal and state courts granted immunity to individual
government officials in three cases from the 1970s involving
commercial transactions. See Greenspan v. Crosbie, 1976 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12155, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95, 780 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23,
1976), reported in 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int'l L. 1017, 1076 (No. 62)
(indicating that the State Department issued a Suggestion of
Immunity for the three individual defendants, who included the
current Premier of Newfoundland, for alleged violations of § 10b of
' Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 7,
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555).
1 Reply Brief of Petitioner at 15, Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No.
08-1555).
616 [Vol. 15:3
HeinOnline  -- 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 616 2011
2011] ANNOTATED BRIEF OF PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE 617
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Heaney v. Government of Spain,
445 F.2d 501, 503-04 (2d Cir. 1971) (determining, in an action
against the Government of Spain and its current Consul General
for the alleged non-payment of fees due under a contract, that the
contract was not enforceable by a U.S. court because it concerned
diplomatic activity); Oliner v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 311 N.Y.S.2d 429,
434 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (finding that the current Custodian of
the Department of the Secretary of State of Canada could not be
brought within the court's jurisdiction in a suit involving the
ownership of shares of capital stock issued by a Canadian
corporation). It is in this specialized context that a Texas court had
previously found that a claim for breach of contract against an
individual official was really a suit against the foreign government
itself. See Bradford v. Dir. Gen. of RKs of Mex., 278 S.W. 251 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) (finding that a suit for breach of contract to paint
railroad bridges against a current "agent of the Mexican
government in the management of its railroad" was really a suit
against the Mexican government). Bradford illustrates circumstances
in which "the effect of exercising jurisdiction [over the individual
defendant] would be to enforce a rule of law against the state."
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, § 66(f) (1965).
Importantly, not all courts during this period found immunity
for individual officials, even when the claims in suit involved actions
taken by those individuals in their capacities as agents of a foreign
state. See Pilger v. United States Steel Corp. and Public Trustee, 98 N.J.
Eq. 665 (N.J. Ct. App. 1925) (determining that a German citizen
could sue a British public trustee for allegedly unlawfully seizing
stock certificates belonging to the plaintiff from a London bank);
Lyders v. Lund, 32 F.2d 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1929) (where plaintiff
sought an accounting by the consul of Denmark, a decree for the
balance due, and the sale of assets to satisfy plaintiffs claim,
observing that the acts of foreign officials should be treated as acts
of the foreign state if "the foreign state will have to respond directly
or indirectly in the event of a judgment," and declining to find
immunity in the instant case); Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the
Department of State from May 1952 to January 1977 (M. Sandler,
D. Vagts, & B. Ristau, eds.), in 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int'l L. 1017,
1062-63 (No. 62) (reporting that, in Cole v. Heitman (S.D.N.Y.
1968), the State Department declined to suggest immunity for the
British West Indies Central Labor Organization or its liaison officer,
despite the Jamaican ambassador's representation that the
organization was "an official agency and arm of the Government
acting without profit to itself in the conduct of public acts").
Petitioner fails to cite either Pilger or Lyders, and he fails to mention
that Cole denied immunity for alleged civil rights violations
including false arrest and imprisonment, which the State
Department deemed "private" activities in the circumstances under
the 1952 Tate Letter standard. 1977 Dig. U.S. Prac. Int'l L. 1017 at
1063.
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In sum, pre-FSIA cases do not support Petitioner's sweeping
claim to blanket immunity for foreign officials. The cases did not
uniformly find immunity, and no case found immunity from
jurisdiction in circumstances remotely resembling those at issue
here.
At oral argument, the Justices grappled with the question of what
limiting principle would prevent a plaintiff from simply naming a state
official as the defendant in order to circumvent the immunity of the
state, if the state and its officials were separable. Their questions focused
largely on the nature of the relief requested.
JUSTICE BREYER: Why can't you say that if ... the relief would
affect the foreign state, you are suing the foreign state?
But where [the individual defendant] was a member of the
foreign state, and you want money from him, even though what he
did in the past was an act of a foreign state, this lawsuit is not
affecting him in his capacity-is not affecting the foreign state.
Indeed, there isn't even one. So in the first set, he falls in the FSIA.
In the second set, he doesn't. And you happen to have the second
set, and, therefore, he may still be immune for what he did in the
past, but that would be a different docket.
MR. DVORETZKY: All right.
JUSTICE BREYER: That-that's where this is all leading me.
MR. DVORETZKY: Because the Restatement-what the
Restatement, which summarized the common laws as of the time of
the FSIA's enactment, says that an official is immune for his acts on
behalf of a state if exercising jurisdiction would enforce a rule of
law against the foreign state. You enforce a rule of law against a
foreign state just as much by threatening to bankrupt an official as
soon as he leaves office-
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How does this case-
MR. DVORETZKY:-as you do by issuing-
JUSTICE GINSBURG: How does this very case establish a rule of
law for the foreign state? The Act is aimed at torturers. The remedy
comes out of the private pocket. How does this establish-if the
thing plays out and the plaintiffs prevail, there will a remedy against
an individual actor; there will be no relief awarded against any
government. How would it set a rule for the foreign government?
MR. DVORETZKY: Because enforcing a judgment against a
foreign official, threatening to bankrupt the person as soon as he or
she leaves office, has just as much effect on the state itself as-as
enforcing ajudgment directly against the state.
Ultimately, the Court decided that the threat of bankrupting officials was
insufficient to bring individual officials within the text of the FSIA. The
Court was careful not to decide at this juncture whether § 66(f) of the
" Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 61-63.
618 [Vol. 15:3
HeinOnline  -- 15 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 618 2011
2011] ANNOTATED BRIEF OF PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE 619
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which Mr. Dvoretzky
referenced in his response to Justice Breyer, accurately reflects the scope
of common law immunity. It did, however, note that a suit against an
individual official might have to be dismissed if the state is a necessary
party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and that state is immune
under the FSIA. It also noted that, in some cases where an individual
official is the named defendant, the state might actually be the real party
in interest,23 thereby entitling the individual to assert common-law
immunity (or, alternatively, to request dismissal for failure to name the
real party in interest). These two scenarios are consistent with the
account that amici provided of pre-FSIA case law in the United States and
elsewhere, in which courts found that individuals were immune when
"the state is either the real party in interest or a necessary party."
VII. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even though the claims against Samantar were based on his alleged
violations of international law, Samantar relied on international law to
argue that he was entitled to immunity.24 Justice Kennedy summarized
this argument as follows:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, and then I-I had thought-again,
correct me if I am wrong-that, ultimately, in this case, whether or
not within the issues here present-ultimately, you have two
arguments. One is that it's just implicit, inherent, necessary for the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act that agents be covered;
otherwise it won't work.
The other-I take it you have a backup position that even if
that's wrong, that under generally accepted principles of
international law, that agents still have immunity."
Counsel for Samantar responded: "Our position is that the FSIA
incorporates the common law and that Mr. Samantar is entitled to
immunity under the statute. If you disagree with us on that, we would
certainly wish to assert common law defenses on remand, but we believe
that the statute resolves the question." In this exchange, and in the
Samantar opinion itself, the relationship between customary international
law and the common law remains unclear. The Court rejected
Samantar's argument that international law compels an expansive
27
reading of the FSIA to encompass foreign officials. The Court further
21 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2290 n.15.
2 Id. at 2292 (citing Republic of Philippines v. Pimentel, 128 S. Ct. 2180 (2008)).
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
22 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2292 (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)).
2' Brief of Petitioner, supra note 6, at 31-41.
2 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 25.
2 Id. at 26.
27 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2289-90, 2290 n.14.
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indicated that "[bjecause we are not deciding that the FSIA bars
petitioner's immunity but rather that the Act does not address the
question, we need not determine whether declining to afford immunity
to petitioner would be consistent with international law."" With respect
to the current state of customary international law, amici argued as
follows:
Petitioner's claim that "the overwhelming current international
authority," Pet. Br. 19, provides immunity to former foreign officials
sued in their personal capacity for acts of torture and extrajudicial
killing is simply incorrect." Petitioner cites a Reporter's Note to §
464 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1987), which states that "[o]rdinarily" the acts of
foreign officials "are not within the jurisdiction to prescribe of
other states." Pet. Br. 38. He relies on this for the proposition that
former foreign officials should therefore be immune from suit. Id.
But jurisdiction to prescribe (as opposed to jurisdiction to
adjudicate) is not at issue here. The very comment Petitioner cites
indicates, in a sentence he does not quote: "However, a former
head of state appears to have no immunity from jurisdiction to
adjudicate." Rest. (3d) of For. Rel. § 464 n.14. Petitioner's other
foreign and international law citations are similarly misguided.
Under international law, the immunities of foreign officials are
governed by a combination of treaties and customary international
law principles, not all of which have been codified in domestic
statutes. Some officials, notably current diplomats, sitting heads of
state, and a narrow class of current high-level officials such as
incumbent foreign ministers, may benefit from status-based
immunity (immunity ratione personae). Some others, whether
currently in office or not, may invoke certain forms of conduct-
based immunity (immunity ratione materiae). Although some foreign
courts have recognized certain immunities for foreign officials who
were not diplomats, consuls, or sitting heads of state, they have
2 Id. at 2290 n.14.
Petitioner also conspicuously ignores the well established lack of immunity
from criminal proceedings for former foreign officials under international law, which
even his amici acknowledge. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress
in Support of Petitioner at 5, 7-8, 43, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555)
(emphasizing that there is no immunity from prosecution "in any court of a state
empowered to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction"); Brief of Amici Curiae Former
Attorneys General of the United States in Support of Petitioner at 17, Samantar, 130
S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) (assuming incorrectly that a lack of immunity from criminal
prosecution can coexist with blanket immunity from civil suit under the FSIA or as a
matter of international law); cf Brief for Amicus Curiae the Anti-Defamation League,
Supporting Neither Side at 6, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555) ("When
individuals acting under color of law perpetrate such atrocities, they can and should
be held criminally responsible regardless of rank or title."). See also infra note 36
(indicating that there is no legal basis for drawing a sharp distinction for immunity
purposes between civil proceedings for torture and criminal proceedings for the
same conduct).
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done so inconsistently, usually in the contexts of suits in which the
state is either the real party in interest or a necessary party.
Because these cases have been relatively few and far between, it is
difficult to draw meaningful generalizations from them ....
Moreover, none of the specialized immunities found by these few
cases would shield Petitioner from suit.
A. Former Officials Cannot Claim Status-Based Immunity
The two recognized forms of status-based immunity are
diplomatic immunity and head of state immunity. Former officials
cannot claim status-based immunity under international law.
Diplomatic immunity is solely intended to enable diplomats to
perform their missions free from interference by the receiving state.
Today, diplomatic immunity is governed primarily by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No.
7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 96 (entered into force with respect to the
United States on December 13, 1972); see also Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e." Under the Vienna
Convention, foreign diplomatic agents accredited by a receiving
state enjoy status-based immunity from criminal and most civil
proceedings during their appointment, see Art. 31(1), although
such immunity may be waived by the sending state. See Art. 32.
The State Department has the exclusive authority to accredit
diplomats. The State Department may also suggest status-based
immunity from service of process for members of special diplomatic
missions. See, e.g., Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest
of the United States, Li Weixun v. Bo Xilai, Civ. No. 04-0649 (D.D.C.
July 24, 2006) at *11 n.9 (suggesting immunity from service of
process for invitee of the Executive branch but emphasizing that
"[s]pecial mission immunity would not... encompass all foreign
official travel")."
The International Court of Justice has recognized the status-
based immunity of an incumbent foreign minister under the
principle that sitting heads of state are entitled to immunity from
the legal process of foreign courts. See Case Concerning the Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
30 In the United States, status-based diplomatic immunity also extends to certain
accredited members of U.N. Missions, who may be treated as diplomats. See
Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding
the Headquarters of the United Nations, U.S.-U.N., § 15,June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 3416.
3 In contrast to accredited diplomats, consular officials do not enjoy status-based
immunity, and are instead protected by conduct-based immunity under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, for acts performed in the exercise of their
consular functions. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77. By the express terms of the applicable treaties, former diplomats and
consuls continue to enjoy limited conduct-based immunity after they leave office for
acts specifically performed in the exercise of their diplomatic or consular functions.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 39(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227;
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra, art. 53(4).
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Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, at 3 (Feb. 14, 2002). U.S.
courts have also recognized the status-based immunity of sitting
heads of state. See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004)
(rejecting application of FSIA to President of China but finding
him immune from service of process as sitting head of state);
Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding
elected President of Haiti immune from suit as sitting head of state,
even in exile).
By definition, status-based immunities only apply during a
diplomat's or head of state's tenure in office. See Arrest Warrant
Case at 25-26 (emphasizing that absolute immunity ends once a
foreign minister leaves office); see also Notice of Changed
Circumstances Submitted by the United States of America, Mumtaz
v. Ershad, No. 74258/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. March 1991) (withdrawing
previous suggestion of immunity in light of defendant's resignation
as President of Bangladesh). Because former foreign officials such
as Petitioner are private individuals who no longer represent their
respective governments, they cannot claim status-based immunity
from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
B. The Handful Of Foreign Cases That Have Found Immunity For
Individual Officials All Involved Specialized Circumstances, And
Do Not Support Blanket Immunity
The foreign and international cases cited by Petitioner do not in
any way support his assertion that " [n]ow, as in 1976, courts around
the world recognize that officials are entitled to sovereign immunity
in civil suits challenging their official-capacity acts." Pet. Br. 36. It is
true that several foreign courts have declined to find individual
officials personally liable for engaging in certain transactions purely
on behalf of a foreign state. However, all of the cases that Petitioner
cites can be distinguished from the claims at issue here. Contrary to
Petitioner's assertion, Pet. Br. 36, no "reciprocity" concerns require
inventing a category of immunity that has not been recognized
consistently by courts in other countries.
32 Citations by one of Petitioner's amici to cases involving the immunity of states
themselves are not germane to the analysis here, because such immunity is clearly
governed in the United States by the FSIA. See Bouzari v. Islamic Republic of Iran
(2004), 220 O.A.C. 1, para. 48, 50-51 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (in a case brought directly
against the state of Iran, finding that Iran was entitled to immunity under the
Canadian SIA, because torture is not a commercial act); Kalogeropoulou v. Greece &
Germany, App. 59021/00, 129 I.L.R. 537, 545-47 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002) (admissibility)
(finding that Greece had not violated the applicants' right of access to court by
allowing Germany to invoke state immunity as a defense to civil enforcement
proceedings in Greece); Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, 107 I.L.R. 536, 540 (Ct.
App. 1996) (Eng.) (finding no exception under the U.K. SIA for damages claim for
alleged acts of torture brought directly against the Government of Kuwait); Saudi
Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 362 (1993) (in the context of a claim brought directly
against the state of Saudi Arabia, stating that "[e]xercise of the powers of police and
penal officers is not the sort of action by which private parties can engage in commerce"
under the FSIA) (emphasis added). Moreover, some foreign courts have denied
immunity for states and for individual co-defendants. See, e.g., Ferrini v. Federal
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i. Courts Have Not Found Immunity Where Only The Assets Of
The Individual Are At Issue, Although Some Courts Have
Found Immunity Where AJudgment Would Involve The Assets
Of The Foreign State
Petitioner cites several cases involving the assets of foreign states.
Pet. Br. 28-29, 32. However, the assets of a foreign state are not at
issue here. Of utmost relevance here, where only the assets of the
individual but not the state are at issue, foreign courts have not
granted immunity. See Saorstat and Continental Steamship Co. v. Rafael
de las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, reprinted in 12 I.L.R. 97, 98 (S.C.)
(Ir.) (finding that a colonel in the Spanish army who had
contracted to carry horses from Dublin to Lisbon for use by the
Spanish army was not entitled to immunity because "[h]e is sued in
his personal capacity and the judgment which has been, or any
judgment which may hereafter be, obtained against him will bind
merely the appellant personally, and any such judgment cannot be
enforced against any property save that of the appellant")."
On the other hand, when a suit nominally brought against an
individual official would in fact involve adjudicating ownership of a
foreign state's assets or granting a damages remedy directly against
Republic of Germany, 128 I.L.R. 659, 674 (Ct. Cass. 2004) (It.) [notation regarding
availability of English translation omitted] (ordering Germany to pay damages to an
Italian abducted by the German army in 1944 and deported to Germany to work as a
forced laborer); Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait, 100 I.L.R. 465, 466-67 (Ct. App.
1994) (Eng.) (referencing but not reviewing the High Court's conclusion that the
three individual defendants were not immune from service of process outside the
jurisdiction).
" According to the Irish Supreme Court in Saorstat, the possibility that the
Spanish Government might indemnify the colonel, whether voluntarily or
compulsorily, did not turn the suit into one against the Government. Saorstat &
Cont'l S.S. Co. v. Rafael de las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (Ir.), reprinted
in 12 Ann. Dig. 97, 99. Justice O'Byrne wrote for the court, "Where the Sovereign is
not named as a party and where there is no claim against him for damages or
otherwise, and where no relief is sought against his person or his property, [the
Sovereign cannot] be said to be impleaded either directly or indirectly." Id. at 101.
One foreign intermediate appellate court has taken a broader view of the role of
potential indemnification in a case involving a prosecutor's decision to file criminal
charges. SeeJaffe v. Miller (1993), 64 O.A.C. 20, para. 31-34 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (finding
that the defendants, who included the Attorney General of Florida, were
"functionaries" acting "within the scope of [their] duties and in furtherance of a
public act" when they filed criminal charges that led to the plaintiffs conviction in
Florida, and that these defendants could claim immunity because "[i]n the event that
the plaintiff recovered judgment, the foreign state would have to respond to it by
indemnifying [them]"). The Jaffe court emphasized that its ruling was limited to the
facts of the cases before it, noting that both the person sued and the function
performed must be considered, and that "[i]t will be a matter of fact for the court to
decide in each case whether any given person performing a particular function is a
functionary of the foreign state" for immunity purposes. Id. at para. 33. There is
certainly no broad consensus or settled law in favor of immunity that would warrant
judicially imputing immunity into the FSIA's text, the terms of which provide no
framework for individual immunity analysis or resolution of the role of
indemnification.
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the treasury of a foreign state, some courts have found immunity.
For example, in Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, (1848) 9 E.R.
993 (H.L.) (U.K.), which provides the foundation for much of the
subsequent jurisprudence, the House of Lords refused to inquire
into the legality of the appointment of a guardian for the
management of the Duke of Brunswick's property, under the laws
of Brunswick and Hanover. Lord Lyndhurst, who agreed with the
court's disposition, affirmed that "[other] circumstances may exist
in which a foreign Sovereign may be sued in this country for acts
done abroad." Id. at 1001. Other cases, relying on a similar
principle, all involved claims for which the foreign state was a
necessary party or otherwise the real party in interest. See Grunfeld v.
United States, (1968) 3 N.S.W.R. 36 (Austl.) (finding the
Commanding Officer of the U.S. Rest and Recuperation Office in
Sydney immune from claims arising from the termination of a
contract to obtain civilian clothing for hire on behalf of the office);
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379 (H.L.) (U.K)
(finding a suit that named the former High Commissioner of
Pakistan as a defendant barred by sovereign immunity because it
involved determining Pakistan's entitlement to funds held in a
London bank account); Johnson v. Turner, G.R. No. L-6118 (S.C.
Apr. 26, 1954) (Phil.) (finding U.S. officers immune from suit by a
U.S. citizen for the dollar value of military payment certificates
(scrip money) because the claim and judgment would be "a charge
against and a financial liability to the U.S. Government"); Syquia v.
Almeda Lopez, G.R. No. L-1648, 84 Phil. Rep. 312 (S.C. Aug. 17,
1949) (finding that the United States was the real party in interest
in a claim for back rents owed by the U.S. military for the lease of
civilian apartment buildings in which U.S. army officers were
billeted and quartered); Compania Naviera Vascongada v. Steamship
Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485 (H.L. 1938) (U.K.) (specifying, in a
judgment by Lord Atkin, that courts will not seek "specific property
or damages" from a foreign sovereign, and will not "seize or detain
property which is his, or of which he is in possession or control");
Twycross v. Dreyfus, (1877) 5 Ch.D. 605 (Ct. App.) (U.K) (finding
lack of jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim to the proceeds of the sale
of guano owned by the Republic of Peru because the Republic was a
necessary party as the owner of the guano).
Because Respondents are not attempting to recover damages
from Somalia or to adjudicate the title to Somali assets, but instead
sue Petitioner in his "personal capacity," Saorstat, 12 I.L.R. at 98, the
rationale of these foreign cases does not support immunity for him.
ii. One Court Found Immunity For A Current Official From An
Injunction Involving A Document Request, But This Does Not
Support Blanket Immunity For A Former Official For Torture
And Extrajudicial Killing
Petitioner relies on the Church of Scientology Case, reprinted in 65
I.L.R. 193 (BGH 1978) (F.R.G.), for the proposition that suing
individual officials automatically undermines the sovereignty of the
state. Pet. Br. 37. This single case cannot support such a sweeping
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claim. In Church of Scientology, the plaintiff sought an injunction
against the current head of New Scotland Yard to prevent him from
complying with a document request from Germany to the United
Kingdom under their 1961 Agreement on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters. Because the United Kingdom had a treaty
obligation to comply with Germany's request, the German Supreme
Court reasoned that the U.K. official's act of complying with the
request "can only be attributed to the British State and not to him or
any other official acting on behalf of the State, because the State is
always to be considered the actor when one of its functionaries
performs acts which are incumbent on it." Id. at 195 (emphasis
added). This reasoning relates to the state's "sovereign activity" of
complying with international law-not (as in Petitioner's case)
violating it. It would turn Church of Scientology on its head to find
that its holding as to compliance with international law obligations
is relevant to a claim arising out of the breach of the international
prohibitions against torture and extrajudicial killing.'
iii. Several Additional Cases Found Immunity For Current
Officials In Specialized Circumstances That Do Not Apply To
Petitioner
A few foreign courts have found immunity for current officials in a
handful of sui generis contexts, including the application of
specialized domestic immunity statutes. These cases do not support
Petitioner's assertion that international law requires granting blanket
immunity to former officials.
One case found immunity for a current official because he was
not even in office at the time the alleged acts occurred. In these
circumstances, there was no basis for finding the official personally
liable and no basis for bringing a suit against him in his personal
capacity. See Propend Finance Pty. Ltd. v. Sing, reprinted in 111 I.L.R.
611, 662 (U.K. Ct. App 1997) (finding no basis for suing the
Analogously, an international tribunal found that a current individual official
was immune from service of a subpoena because only the state, not the individual,
would be subject to sanction for non-compliance. See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14, Judgement on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the
Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, 1 38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia [ICTY] Oct. 29, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/acdec/
en/71029JT3.html (finding that the ICTY does not have the legal authority to seek
documents under ICTY Statute Article 29(2) by issuing subpoenas to current
government officials in their official capacity, because the ICTY is not empowered to
impose sanctions on states in the event of non-compliance). The decision in Blashic
does not affect the scope of conduct-based immunity for former officials from the
jurisdiction of national courts, because it only deals with acts that "are not
attributable to [the official] personally" and that can only be enforced against the
state itself, such as the act of complying with a request to produce official documents.
Id. at 1 38. As the ICTY emphasized in Blaskic, "those responsible for [war crimes,
cnmes against humanity, or genocide] cannot invoke immunity from national or
international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their
official capacity," just as spies "although acting as State organs, may be held
personally accountable for their wrongdoing." Id. at 1 41.
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current Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police Force for an
improper fax sent by an Australian diplomat, where the
Commissioner in office at the time the fax was sent had died by the
time of the suit). Going beyond these unique circumstances, the
U.K Court of Appeal opined that "[t]he protection afforded by the
[U.K. State Immunity] Act of 1978 to States would be undermined
if employees, officers (or as one authority puts it, 'functionaries')
could be sued as individuals for matters of State conduct in respect
of which the State they were serving had immunity." Id. at 669. This
statement might be true on the limited facts of Propend Finance and
as a matter of U.K law, but not in this case. First, the "matter of
state conduct" at issue in Propend was the ministerial act of faxing
criminal evidence to an investigating authority, not torture and
extrajudicial killing under color of foreign law. Second, as indicated
below, the U.K State Immunity Act contemplates immunity for
individual officials, whereas the FSIA does not.
Another case found immunity under a specialized statute for the
current Secretary of the European Commission of Human Rights in
a suit alleging that he had presented an edited version of the
plaintiff's claim, rather than the entire claim in plaintiffs own
words, to the Commission. See Zoernsch v. Waldock, (1964) 2 All E.R.
256 (C.A.) (U.K) (finding immunity for the current Secretary of
the Commission under the Council of Europe (Immunities and
Privileges) Order, 1960, and finding immunity for the former
President of the Commission because his name was on a list of
officials entitled to immunity compiled under the International
Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) Act, 1950).
Two remaining cases similarly involved current officials who were
sued for conduct that does not resemble the claims at issue here. See
Holland v. Lampen-Wolfe, (2000] UKHL 40, [2000] 3 All E.R. 833
(H.L.) (U.K.) (finding a supervisor on a U.S. military base immune
from claims for defamation for writing a negative report about U.S.
citizen plaintiff's job performance on the base); Schmidt v. The Home
Secretary, 103 I.L.R. 322 (1994) (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (finding immunity for
current police commissioner and officer in a British extradition
squad who allegedly lured plaintiff to the United Kingdom so that
he could be arrested and extradited to Germany on drug trafficking
charges). These two cases do not support the blanket immunity
Petitioner claims he is owed as a matter of international law.
Petitioner is not a current official, and his alleged conduct does
not fall within the reasoning of these few foreign cases. These cases
do not in any way support blanket immunity for former foreign
officials for torture and extrajudicial killing, much less demonstrate
the even broader proposition that international law requires such
immunity.
Finally, amici addressed the U.K House of Lords' opinion in Jones v.
Saudi Arabia, which held that Saudi Arabia was immune from suit for
torture and that its officials (who were not physically present in the
United Kingdom) were entitled to the immunity of the state under the
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State Immunity Act 1978 (U.K.) (SIA).35 Although the claimants in Jones
had an application challenging that decision pending before the
European Court of Human Rights at the time of oral argument in
Samantar, and although the U.K. SLA is not identical to the U.S. FSIA,
proponents of blanket immunity understandably have sought to recruit
Jones in support of their interpretation of the FSIA. Amici began by
emphasizing the differences between the U.K. SIA and the U.S. FSIA,
and the different role played by customary international law in
interpreting the provisions of these statutes.
In contrast to the FSIA, the SIA defines a "State" to include at least
some individuals, specifically heads of state. See SIA § 14(1) (a). Also
unlike the FSIA, the SIA expressly excludes criminal proceedings,
see id. § 16(4), suggesting that individual officials are covered by the
SIA. Because the SIA did not expressly provide immunity for suits
against officials, however, Lord Bingham of Cornhill looked to
foreign and international authorities to determine whether
individual officials should be considered part of the "State" for
purposes of the SIA. See Jones 11 10-12; see also id. 65-101 (Lord
Hoffmann). Lord Bingham made clear that the source of the
immunity he was applying was domestic law. "It is not suggested that
the Act is in any relevant respect ambiguous or obscure," he said,
and "the duty of the English court is therefore to apply the plain terms
of the domestic statute." See id. 113 (emphasis added).
Lord Bingham's other statements about customary international
law in Jones were made in a context that renders them inapplicable
to the United States and to this case. Specifically, the plaintiffs in
Jones argued that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (providing inter alia for access to courts) required an
exception to the immunity granted by the SIA in cases of torture.
See id. 14-28. Because of the relationship between the European
Convention and U.K. law, the burden was on the plaintiffs to show
that international law required such an exception. See id. 1 14 ("the
onus is clearly on [the claimants] to show that the ordinary
approach to application of a current domestic statute should not be
followed"). Lord Hoffmann also considered whether Article 6 of
the European Convention required an implied exception to the
immunity granted by the SIA and concluded that plaintiffs had
failed to show that an exception was required by international law. See
id. 11 39-64.
In the United States, the burden is obviously not on a plaintiff to
show that an exception to state immunity is required under Article
6 of the European Convention. Rather, the burden is on the
defendant to show that a clear rule of immunity exists. With respect
' Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26, [2007] 1 A.C.
270 (appeal taken from Eng.). Interestingly, Lord Phillips, who sat on the appellate
panel whose opinion in Jones was overtumed by the House of Lords, attended oral
argument in Samantar. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Claims Over Torture in Somalia,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/04/us/04scotus.html.
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to sovereign immunity, this Court has long held that "[t]he
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute" and that "[a]ll exceptions, therefore,...
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow
from no other legitimate source." The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
Amici also indicated that the opinions in Jones misread certain
precedents that do not, in fact, support generalizations about the scope
of official immunity under international law, as opposed to under a
specific domestic statute.
The authorities relied upon by Lords Bingham and Hoffmann in
Jones do not support the proposition that customary international
law requires states to immunize foreign officials from civil suits
alleging torture.n Lord Hoffmann relied heavily on the
International Law Commission's 2001 Draft Articles on State
Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 7 of which
deals with a state's responsibility for the acts of persons empowered
to exercise government authority. See Jones 11 76-78; see also id. 1 12
(Lord Bingham). But whether a state is responsible under
international law for the acts of its officials is a separate question
from whether an individual is responsible under international law
for his or her acts on behalf of a state . On this second question,
the Draft Articles state expressly that they "are without prejudice to
any question of the individual responsibility under international law
of any person acting on behalf of a State." See International Law
Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries (2001), Art. 58.
' There is also no basis in international law (as opposed to U.K. domestic law)
for drawing a sharp distinction between civil proceedings for torture and criminal
proceedings for the same conduct, from which there would be no immunity under
the holding in R. v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.) (findirg no immunity for former Chilean head of state for
torture that occurred in Chile, where dual criminality requirement for extradition
was satisfied). Multiple legal systems blend civil and criminal proceedings, meaning
that a lack of immunity from criminal proceedings entails the possibility of civil
damages. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (indicating that "the criminal
courts of many nations combine civil and criminal proceedings"). Additionally,
"[e]ven within common law systems, torts were historically considered the civil
counterparts of crimes." See Chimane 1. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort
Cases, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 83-84 (2008) (citing sources).
" Lord Hoffmann's conflation of these two questions is also clear in his
misplaced reliance on the 1927 arbitral decision in Mallin v. United States. See Jones,
[2006] UKHL 26, 1 75 (citing Mall6n v United States, 4 R.I.A.A. 173 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n. 1927) (awarding damages to Mexico for the 1907 assault on a former
Mexican consul (Mallen) by a U.S. deputy constable (Franco))). There is no
indication in that decision that the responsibility of the United States precluded any
concurrent civil or criminal responsibility for the deputy constable whose acts were at
issue; to the contrary, he was fined $100 for the assault. See Main, 4 R.I.A.A. at 181.
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Inexplicably, neither Lord Bingham nor Lord Hoffmann cited
Article 58, which discredits their reliance on Article 7.8
Lords Bingham and Hoffmann both relied heavily on the 2004
U.N. Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Properties, which defines "State" to include "representatives
of the State acting in that capacity" and contains no express
exception for torture. SeeJones 1110, 26 (Lord Bingham); id. 11 47,
66 (Lord Hoffmann). The U.N. Convention, which deals largely
with state liability for commercial transactions, has not obtained
even the 30 ratifications necessary for it to enter into force. The
United States has not signed the Convention and is unlikely to do
so because it differs substantially from the terms of the FSIA. See
David P. Stewart, The UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of
States and Their Properties, 99 Am. J. Int'l L. 194, 205 (2005) (noting
that the Convention does not contain exceptions for expropriation
or terrorism); see also id. at 210-11 (noting other objections of the
U.S. delegation). The absence of an exception to immunity from
this Convention does not make such an exception unlawful under
customary international law. As Mr. Stewart, who led the U.S.
delegation, has observed with respect to the terrorism exceptions in
the FSIA, that "would read far too much into the consensus
adoption of the convention." Id. at 206.
In sum, neither Jones nor the authorities on which it relies
support Petitioner's assertion of blanket immunity for all acts taken
by a foreign government official. The question before the House of
Lords in Jones-whether customary international law requires an
exception to the statutory immunity granted by the SIA-is different
from the question in the United States-whether customary
international law requires a grant of immunity in the first place.
With respect to torture and extrajudicial killing at least, it does not.
In his reply brief, Samantar objected strongly to amici's
characterization of the Jones opinion and argued that "Jones clearly holds
that 'international law' imposes a duty to recognize the immunity of
officers accused of committing torture while acting in an official capacity,
and that a state may not, 'as a matter of discretion, relax or abandon' this
immunity."3 9 Of course, even if this were the United Kingdom's position
based on its reading of relevant materials, U.S. courts would not be
" The Commentaries to the Draft Articles also make clear that "the rules
concerning attribution set out in this chapter are formulated for this particular
purpose, and not for other purposes for which it may be necessary to define the State
or its Government." Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 10-
Aug. 10, 2001, at 82, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001). It is
inappropriate to use Draft Article 7, which codifies an international law principle
developed to protect victims by providing them with a basis for diplomatic claims
against the offending state, to curtail the remedies available to victims of such
conduct. See id. at 99-100 (explaining rationale for attributing conduct performed
with apparent authority to the state).
* Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 19, at 21 (quotingJones, [2006] UKHL 26,
1101).
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bound by that position, especially in cases involving defendants who are
present on U.S. territory. It is also worth noting that even those who
argue that Samantar should benefit from immunity from civil
proceedings for torture agree that he would not be immune from
criminal prosecution in a U.S. court.40 While there might be policy
reasons to differentiate between civil and criminal proceedings in the
United States (for example, a general preference for having claims
brought by the Executive, rather than by private individuals), these
reasons are insufficient as a legal matter to compel immunity from civil
proceedings while denying it in criminal proceedings for the same
conduct.
Although the difference between civil and criminal proceedings was
not raised during oral argument, the question of the executive branch's
role was discussed at some length, for example in this exchange between
Justice Scalia and counsel for Yousuf:
JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, the-the State Department wants to
be able to decide whether individuals will be held liable, whether
they were acting in an official capacity or not; isn't that it?
MS. MILLETT: Well, they-that-I'll let them speak for their
own position. I think certainly-certainly there are a variety of
doctrines, a variety of hurdles any case has to get through. And it's
not just the Executive's views on a case. There's things like
exhaustion. There's necessary party inquiries. There's the act of
state doctrine. There's substantive limits on what one can sue for.
You know, the Torture Victim Protection Act is Congress's
judgment that individuals who do this, consistent with international
law, whatever else-individuals who engage in torture and
extrajudicial killing are held personally liable in Congress's views
and in the views of international law. And the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act doesn't stop that.
And what's critical, again, is the-
JUSTICE SCALIA: I must say-
MS. MILLET:-language that's missing-
JUSTICE SCALIA:-that I find it much more acceptable to have
the State Department say that a particular foreign country should
be let off the hook, which is what they used to do with the Tate
letters, than I do to leave it up to the State Department whether-
whether an individual human being shall be-shall be punished or
not. I-I somehow find that less within the realm of the-of the
foreign affairs power of the State Department."
40 See Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress, supra note 29, at 5;
Brief of Amic Cuiae Former Attorneys General of the United States, supra note 29, at 17.
" Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 16, at 44-45.
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The precise role of the Executive is one of the various issues that lower
courts will have to address in the first instance, beginning with the district
court on remand in Samantaritself.42
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Although the Samantar opinion is primarily an exercise in statutory
interpretation, one can take a step back and view the case as part of an
evolving jurisprudence on accountability for international law violations
in U.S. courts. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court confirmed
that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) provides U.S. federal courts with
jurisdiction over a limited number of particularly serious international
law violations.4 ' The Sosa Court did not specifically hold that official
torture was actionable under the ATS, but it did endorse a line of
reasoning that had previously reached this result." In addition, Congress
has enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act as a note to § 1350, which
specifically provides a cause of action against individual defendants for
torture and extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign law.
One of the numerous current battlegrounds in ATS litigation
involves the question of whether or not corporations, in addition to
individual human beings, can be sued under that statute. In finding that
corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, a panel of the Second
Circuit emphasized that "the moral responsibility for a crime so heinous
and unbounded as to rise to the level of an 'international crime' has
rested solely with the individual men and women who have perpetrated
it." Given this emphasis on individual moral responsibility, one might
expect a corresponding resistance to the idea that individuals are
automatically immune from legal consequences for their internationally
unlawful acts, particularly when such individuals have voluntarily entered
the United States and are neither current heads of state nor diplomats.
The complementarity principle, whereby domestic courts act as
decentralized enforcers of international law prohibitions, has been more
explicitly institutionalized in criminal than civil proceedings.7 However,
42 See Keitner, supra note 4, at 71-75 (arguing that the views of the Executive are
entitled to absolute deference on questions of status-based immunity, but only to
substantial weight on questions of conduct-based immunity).
542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350.(2006).
* Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980)).
" Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992), (codified as a note after 28 U.S.C. § 1350).
46 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 119 (2d. Cir. 2010); see
generally Chimane I. Keitner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: Another Round in the
Fight Over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, AM. Soc'Y Ir'L L. (Sept. 30,
2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100930.cfm.
47 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761-63 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (discussing the international "consensus as to universal criminal
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many of the core justifications for criminal complementarity also apply to
civil proceedings. International law governs the conduct of individuals,
not only states. Given the limited capacity and mandate of international
tribunals to adjudicate individual culpability in many instances, the task
falls to domestic courts to provide an additional layer of enforcement,
albeit one that is circumscribed by considerations of reasonableness and
comity. A rule of blanket immunity for individual foreign officials is
incompatible with this framework, and does not have greater support
under the common law than it does under the FSIA.
jurisdiction" and suggesting that "universal tort jurisdiction would be no more
threatening," particularly since "universal criminal jurisdiction necessarily
contemplates a significant degree of civil tort recovery as well").
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